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This chapter aims to contribute to the theoretical and practical field by deepening the understanding of the relationships between the main contemporary determinants of corruption and the allocation of public goods and services in Colombia. The study integrates findings from a systematic review of scientific literature and open-ended interviews with key actors from the public sector, the private sector, and civil society. Rather than presenting corruption as an isolated deviation or the outcome of individual misconduct, the research frames it as a structural, cultural, and institutional phenomenon, deeply embedded in the evolution of the country’s governance. The analysis identifies three interpretative dimensions: institutional deterioration and governance capture, cultural and ethical transformations in society, and oversight processes and the safeguarding of the public good. By mapping these variables and their interrelations, the study contributes to a deeper understanding of how systemic corruption undermines effectiveness, equity, and legitimacy in the allocation of public resources. The findings provide both conceptual and practical implications for the design of public policies, institutional reforms, and anticorruption strategies tailored to the Colombian sociopolitical context, while also offering valuable insights for other countries facing similar structural challenges.
Department of Accounting and Finance, Universidad del Valle, Cali, Colombia
*Address all correspondence to: ibisdaniloyanguas@gmail.com
1. Introduction
Corruption constitutes one of the most complex phenomena confronting contemporary democracies. In the international arena, it undermines the legitimacy of institutions, distorts the economy, deepens social inequality, and erodes citizens’ trust in the state. Corruption cannot be reduced to isolated acts of ethical deviation; rather, it must be understood as a systemic structure that permeates the allocation of resources, the exercise of power, and the safeguarding of fundamental rights [1, 2].
In the Global South, this phenomenon acquires particular relevance, as it is closely linked to social inequality, the capture of public institutions by political and economic elites, and the persistence of exclusionary development models [3, 4]. Corruption scandals in public procurement illustrate how networks of power operate both within formal legality and through informal practices, blurring the boundaries between the public and the private, between the rule and its transgression [5].
Colombia both reproduces and experiences these dynamics, displaying a web of corruption manifested in recurrent high-profile scandals as well as in everyday practices that affect the lives of millions of citizens [6]. From the inequitable distribution of the public budget to the cooptation of oversight systems, corruption in Colombia functions as a structural phenomenon, instrumental to certain forms of governance, and normalized within the collective imagination. This reality poses urgent challenges for democracy, public ethics, and the effectiveness of the Social Rule of Law [7, 8].
This chapter seeks to deepen the understanding of corruption in Colombia through a contemporary analysis of the phenomenon during the period 2014–2023, examined from the perspective of the allocation of public goods and services and articulated around interpretative dimensions that link the cultural and institutional aspects shaping it. These findings emerge from an analysis of specialized scientific literature and interviews conducted with key actors from the public sector, the private sector, and civil society.
This analysis does not interpret corruption as a dysfunction of the system; on the contrary, it reveals it as a logic reproduced through practices, discourses, and institutions. In this regard, the study is framed within a critical perspective that contributes elements for academic and political reflection, as well as for the construction of a democratic ethic capable of contesting the meaning of the public against the normalized forms of corruption.
This section seeks to develop connections among the interpretive dimensions by employing grounded theory [9], with the aim of subsuming within them a broad and in-depth explanation of the causes of corruption in Colombia through the allocation of public goods and services. It should be noted that the section begins by applying the methodological design of Strauss and Corbin [10] for the development of open, axial, and selective coding, which led to the formulation of the interpretive dimensions. What follows is the definition of these dimensions, together with their description, the axial coding categories that were incorporated, and the corresponding codes from which such coding emerged.
2.1 Interpretive lines that explain causal interaction
The following section presents the interpretive dimensions that subsume the open, axial, and selective coding. These dimensions were developed on the basis of 30 open-ended interviews with politicians and public officials, entrepreneurs and professionals in the sector, as well as civil society actors who either confront or endure the phenomenon of corruption. The sample is considered relevant according to the literature [11, p. 225; 12, p. 1783]. For the coding process, grounded theory as validated by Glaser and Holton [9] and Strauss and Corbin [10] was employed. The software Atlas.ti 8.0 was used exclusively for word frequency analysis; in other words, the open, axial, and selective categories were constructed without software, just as the interviews were manually transcribed from voice to text.
2.1.1 Institutional deterioration and governance capture
This line links the structural, normative, and functional dimensions of the state and the organizations that permit, reproduce, or combat corruption. This is where governance failures, institutional weaknesses, a lack of justice, and the contradiction between legal mandate and its implementation are evident.
Integrated axial categories
Structural corruption, public administration in Colombia
Corruption, judicial system, impunity, and justice
Corruption, Social Rule of Law, and political regime
Corruption and public finance
Corruption, democracy, public procurement, bribery, and cronyism
The selective coding performed is presented in Figure 1 as an illustration (see Figure 1).
Figure 1.
Institutional deterioration and capturing of governance.
Definition of institutional deterioration and governance capture
This interpretative dimension constitutes the central axis of the analysis, as it represents the visible and operational manifestation of public systems coopted by private or illegitimate interests. From a theoretical standpoint, it refers to a model of institutional management in which formal rules are systematically altered by actors who prioritize personal gains over the public interest. Methodologically, this category is shaped by empirical accounts that reveal regulatory deviations, state capture, systemic corruption practices, and the absence of accountability. It emerges from both cultural and structural dynamics, particularly sustained by a permissive culture toward corruption and the weakness of oversight mechanisms.
2.1.2 Cultural and ethical mutations in society
This line brings together the subjective, behavioral, symbolic, and relational factors that allow us to understand how corruption is legitimized, reproduced, and normalized at different social, cultural, and personal levels. It includes values, attitudes, social networks, everyday practices, and cultural codes.
Figure 2 shows the construction of the semantic network that incorporates the axial coding, constructed using the relevant codes called open coding (see Figure 2).
Figure 2.
Cultural–ethical mutations in society.
Definition of cultural and ethical mutation in society
This interpretative dimension represents the web of values, practices, and informal norms that justify, tolerate, or legitimize corruption as a customary way of addressing public and private matters. Within the framework of grounded theory, this variable emerges from the analysis of discourses that reveal early socialization into the tolerance of illegality, an individualistic ethic oriented toward immediate gain, and a weak social sanction against corrupt behavior. Methodologically, it is identified as a construct that cuts across the micro level (family, schools), the meso level (communities), and the macro level (media and political leadership), directly shaping perceptions of the public sphere.
2.1.3 Processes of oversight and safeguarding of the public good
This line addresses practices of social, accounting, budgetary, and political control, as well as how resources are distributed, accountability is exercised, and transparency is reversed or improved. This articulates accounting, economic, fiscal, ecological, and civic aspects of power and corruption.
Integrated axial categories
Corruption, decentralization, auditing, budgeting, and accounting
Corruption, citizen participation, accountability, and transparency
Corruption, market, regulation, and the environment
Figure 3 is the construction of the semantic network, which graphically shows the selective coding with its respective axial coding (see Figure 3).
Figure 3.
Processes of oversight and safeguarding of the public good.
Definition of public control deficit
This interpretative dimension refers to the absence or ineffectiveness of institutional and social mechanisms to monitor, sanction, and prevent corruption. Methodologically, this category is identified through the analysis of deficiencies in oversight bodies, limited access to public information, low levels of citizen participation, and the weakness of investigative journalism. From a theoretical perspective, it is argued that corruption persists and deepens where effective checks on power are lacking, creating a favorable environment for illicit practices and the consolidation of clientelist networks. This deficit is not merely technical but also cultural and political, as it reflects a lack of collective will to exercise democratic oversight.
Table 1 describes in greater depth and organization the categories that emerge in the interpretive lines developed through selective and axial coding.
Interpretative line
Propiedades
Dimensions
Institutional deterioration and governance capture
Institutional cooptation
High
Diversion of resources
National and subnational
State capture
Total
Opacity in management
High
Cultural and ethical mutations in society
Normalization of corrupt practices
High – generalized
Social tolerance
High – tolerant
Educational reproduction
High – permanent
Ethical component
Individualistic
Processes of oversight and safeguarding of the public good
Institutionality
Fragile
Citizen surveillance
Absent
Lack of access to information
Partial
Control entities
Inoperative/partially active
Table 1.
Contemporary determinants of corruption in Colombia.
Source: prepared by the author based on Strauss and Corbin [10].
Causal relationships of the interpretive lines
In Table 2, it can be observed that these relationships aim to associate the variables with each other in order to shape the causal model.
Interpretative line
Relationship
Interpretative line
Cultural and ethical mutations in society
↔
Institutional deterioration and governance capture
Processes of oversight and safeguarding of the public
↔
Institutional deterioration and governance capture
Cultural and ethical mutations in society
↔
Processes of oversight and safeguarding of the public
Table 2.
Causal relationships of interpretive lines.
Once the causal model is defined, Figure 4 is incorporated, which shows the relationships among the interpretive lines.
Figure 4.
Causal relationships of interpretive lines.
This causal relationship among the interpretative dimensions seeks to demonstrate the existence of two-way interactions between the constructs, indicating that they are not isolated; on the contrary, it shows that they are intrinsically interconnected, forming an essential part of the ecosystem of corruption in Colombia.
This section presents a detailed analysis of the dimensions that shape the in-depth examination of corruption in the allocation of public goods and services in Colombia. The identified dimensions are interconnected through causal relationships, feedback loops, and tensions that configure a complex system of structural corruption. Each of them is presented later.
4.1 Analytical description of the interpretive
This section analyzes the interpretative dimensions in light of the theoretical framework emerging from the state-of-the-art review, which examined 181 academic articles carefully and systematically retrieved from the databases ScienceDirect, Springer Link, and Scopus using the search equation: determinants AND contemporary AND corruption AND Colombia. The parameters for compiling the articles included the title, abstract, keywords, analysis of the introduction, results, and conclusions; filters were also applied to delimit the years 2014–2023. In addition, 30 open-ended interviews were conducted with politicians and public officials, entrepreneurs and sector professionals, and civil society actors. These were cross-checked through triangulation and memos, using Glaser and Strauss's [9] constant comparative method.
4.1.1 Institutional deterioration and governance capture
The conceptualization of this line refers to the use of public power through systematic practices of corruption that distort and divert the processes of formulation, implementation, and oversight of public policies [13, 14]. This pattern of governance is manifested in institutional capture exercised by clientelist networks, mafia-like political structures, or private interests, which replace the collective interest with particular objectives [6]. In the words of one of the interviewees:
“Corruption in Colombia arises from a mix of structural and cultural factors… drug trafficking, violence, and a culture of quick profits. […] Institutions are weak and the State is captured… not only the Executive, but also the Legislative, the Judiciary, and oversight bodies… examples: the ‘toga cartel’, Odebrecht, corruption in the EPS. […] Society has normalized these practices… illicit wealth permeates politics and social life… it erodes public ethics and turns corruption into a means of advancement or survival. […] In summary, it is a systemic phenomenon that undermines democracy and governance, prioritizing illicit interests over collective well-being” (A13, suffer from corruption, personal communication, 23/10/2024).
An actor fighting corruption indicates that:
“The factor that has driven corruption in Colombia is, mainly, the economic interest of certain political and business elites […]. That interest is reflected in the manipulation of contracts and public decisions in favor of private conglomerates […]. This diverts resources that should guarantee basic rights such as health, education, or housing […].
Corruption generates exclusion and inequality […], while many justify these practices with phrases such as ‘he steals, but he gets things done’ […]. In addition, state inefficiency is evident in unfinished projects and failed social programs […].
The population ends up between resignation and protest […], in a context where violence becomes part of everyday life […]. Unlike Europe, where the State responds to social welfare, here mistrust predominates and institutional legitimacy is eroded […]” (A7, fight against corruption, personal communication, 21/02/2025).
Institutional deterioration and the capture of governance undermine the principle of legality, erode the foundations of the Social Rule of Law, and transform public administration into a mechanism that facilitates the dispossession of common resources [1, 15, 16]. This analysis is significant because it integrates patterns of impunity, intentional inefficiency, private appropriation of the state apparatus, and the systematic manipulation of administrative, budgetary, and contractual processes [17, 18]. In the words of one interviewee:
“There is another stage that is no longer about finding a loophole in the law, but rather about making the loophole become law […] the corporate capture of the State” (A3, policymakers, personal communication,10/09/2024).
In this context, the state apparatus, coopted by political, economic, or criminal elites who use it to extract illegitimate rents, turns corruption into a structural phenomenon [19]. In the words of the interviewee:
“What has happened… has to do with the construction of the System and the political regime. That is made to facilitate corruption. […] that was not modified with the constitutional design of 1991” (A3, fight against corruption, personal communication, 28/02/2025).
Corruption produces an institutional framework in which formal rules coexist with informal practices of allocating positions, resources, and benefits. This generates a façade of legality that conceals reality [20, 21]. In the words of a victim:
“There is an institutional framework that, instead of fighting corruption, [is designed to enable it]. Legal loopholes are exploited by lawyers through statute of limitations, counterclaims, and absences, [delaying trials until they expire]. This creates a system where crimes are committed and punishments are evaded, often serving minimal sentences or under house arrest. [Institutions are made by and for them], with lawyers reinforcing the scheme. Thus, the State ends up fostering corruption because it was built for their benefit. [That is why it is no surprise that in Colombia and neighboring countries there are so many corrupt actors]” (A9, suffer from corruption, personal communication, 03/10/2024).
Institutionalized corruption as a form of governance excludes citizens as subjects of rights and participation. The citizen is transformed into a client, an occasional beneficiary, or a silent accomplice [1]. In the words of an interviewee:
“The State cannot be… an instrument at the service of the powerful nor of those who hold great capital […] it is also mistaken to foster a culture in which personal responsibilities are shifted to the… state sphere. […] The powerful… appropriated […] that discourse to continue defending an apparatus that serves them” (A6, suffer from corruption, personal communication, 27/11/2024).
The institutional deterioration and the capture of governance have global implications, such as tax evasion and money laundering [22, 23]. In countries such as Colombia, corrupt practices are connected with transnational criminal networks, external agendas, multinational corporations, and regulatory weaknesses [24]. In the words of an interviewee:
“For example, I had a company in Colombia that worked with foreign trade, and we saw many situations where drug trafficking had an influence […]. It is impossible to erase that word in a sector like foreign trade. In the case of political representation, beyond mentioning any specific party, I would say that DIAN is a tax-collecting entity, and the port, for a single import, depended on political quotas of those appointed to coordination and leadership positions […]. There is a lot of political quota, for example, in the port and even in DIAN itself […], not to mention the customs police such as POLFA and other actors related to taxation, customs, and foreign exchange. I see this political representation as closely connected with issues of drug trafficking and with aspects of our culture […]” (A2, entrepreneurs, personal communication, 21/09/2024).
In summary, institutional deterioration and the capture of governance in Colombia can be defined as a systemic model of public power management, represented by institutional capture, legal simulation, the deviation of the general interest, and the normalization of illicit or immoral practices within state administration. This model is sustained by formal and informal networks that corrupt the functioning of institutions, blur the principle of legality, and replace public ethics with a utilitarian rationality that privileges particular interests. It manifests itself at multiple levels of government and is expressed through systematic patterns of impunity, opacity, citizen exclusion, and the deterioration of public value.
4.1.2 Cultural and ethical mutations of society
This line addresses the set of practices, values, norms, and shared meanings that, either explicitly or implicitly, sustain, justify, or allow the reproduction of corruption in Colombian society [25, 26]. In this context, one interviewee points out that:
“The main factor is the loss of the notion of the public: in Colombia, we don’t see State funds as belonging to all of us, but rather as belonging to ‘no one’ […]. That is why people feel more affected if someone steals $100,000 pesos from their pocket than by the loss of $70 billion in a corruption scandal […]. This lack of education about respecting public resources combines with a political culture that has profited from public funds for decades […]. We have even had presidents who minimize corruption, reinforcing social permissiveness. […].” (A6, policymakers, personal communication, 28/09/2024).
Another interviewee opines:
“It is a cultural issue rooted in upbringing […] since childhood we have been instilled with the mistaken mindset that ‘you have to be clever, and the fool always loses’. […] This culture of taking advantage in any situation […] fuels the mentality of corruption. […] To eradicate it, it is not enough to increase penalties, but rather… to educate children through upbringing and example that promote different values” (A4, fight against corruption, personal communication, 01/02/2025).
In this sense, it becomes evident that corruption is not limited to individual legal transgressions but is deeply intertwined with cultural factors, collective behaviors, social structures, and ethical imaginaries that shape both public and private life [27, 28]. In the words of one interviewee:
“Corruption in this country is not recent […] it has been present throughout the entire republican life […] permeating all levels […] and spheres of society. […] It has become so normalized that those who act with honesty – by returning a lost item or avoiding taking advantage of a public office – are seen as naïve or foolish. […] The phenomenon is historical and structural, part of the culture and social thought, with examples ranging from small misappropriations to multimillion-dollar embezzlements; for many, what is normal is to participate in corruption, and what is abnormal is to refrain from it” (A5, fight against corruption, personal communication, 28/09/2024).
This line articulates deeply rooted cultural phenomena, flexible or relativistic moral codes, and the normalization of corrupt practices that operate at multiple levels of society. This perspective breaks away from the normative–legal paradigm and delves into the symbolic, affective, and contextual understanding of corruption [29–32]. In the words of an interviewee:
“In Colombia, strong discrimination against ethnic communities persists […] although the likelihood of accepting a violation of social norms is similar among Afro-descendants, Indigenous peoples, and those who do not self-identify as part of these groups. […] The country concentrates much of its population in a few urban centers, and its historical, geographical, and climatic diversity influences the way in which the propensity to break social norms is expressed differently in each region, adapting to the local context” (A2, policymakers, personal communication, 30/08/2024).
Corruption is rooted in patterns of behavior that stem from social learning, shared codes, and tacit legitimizations. Thus, in many communities, corruption may be perceived as a strategy for survival, reciprocity, or even as a display of cleverness or power [6, 7]. In the Colombian context, practices such as “rebusque” (informal hustling), political favors, or clientelism may be socially perceived as part of the “natural order of things” rather than as reprehensible conduct. One interviewee notes that:
“It could be argued that, due to those events […], the State achieved a presence in certain departments and municipalities. […] The influence of Córdoba politicians during the period 2010–2018 administration made that institutional reach possible – something that otherwise would not have happened” (A1, fight against corruption, personal communication, 12/09/2024).
Another actor fighting corruption believes that:
“One of the least studied characteristics of capitalism is the breakdown of moral and ethical values in social relations […]. Before capitalism, value was associated with virtues such as honesty, integrity, fraternity, and solidarity […]. With the primacy of dominant interests, the original meaning of values is replaced: today, it is considered ethical to defend the public interest, which in reality is understood as the protection of market interests – something that differs from the defense of the common good” (A6, fight against corruption, personal communication, 03/10/2024).
Public ethics is often displaced by a situational ethics in which values are relativized depending on role, opportunity, need, or context. Moral responsibility becomes diluted and interchangeable [33]. In the words of one interviewee:
“The eagerness for easy enrichment is linked to the drug trafficking culture in the country […]. An illustrative example is the statement of a former politician, who claimed that, had he known the public sector generated so much money, he would not have engaged in drug trafficking […]. (A7, suffer from corruption, personal communication, 04/10/2024).
Social norms are guides for behavior that, when they are permissive toward illegality or even reward it (with status, wealth, or influence), foster a culture conducive to corruption [15]. Corrupt behavior is often based on what people believe others do and expect them to do. In the words of one interviewee:
“Corruption stalls public projects when demands are not met […]. And when they are met, bribes are paid at the cost of poor-quality public works […]. As a result, citizens lose trust in institutions […]. Moreover, influential individuals divert resources to private interests instead of vulnerable communities […]. This generates inefficiency, inequality, and distrust in government. […] The lack of political culture also plays a role: citizens judge candidates by academic credentials rather than public service, enabling corrupt officials to be re-elected […]. Added to this is disinterest and little citizen oversight of taxes, even though everyone pays them […]. This lack of accountability fuels corruption” (A4, policymaker, personal communication, 22/01/2025).
It cannot be ignored that some communities, organizational groups, and specific sectors act as microcultures of corruption, where deviant behavior is internally legitimized. This ranges from practices within universities, professional associations, churches, or political parties to criminal organizations [34, 35]. In the words of an interviewee:
“Although corruption is condemned in discourse across all sectors, no one acknowledges themselves as corrupt […]. Within unionism, two tendencies coexist: a ‘propositive’ one, conciliatory with the employer, and a class-based one, heir to the workers’ struggles of the 19th and 20th centuries, which sought to transform society […]. In Colombia, much of this class-based unionism was either co-opted or annihilated, making the country the one with the highest number of union victims in the world” (A5, fight against corruption, personal communication, 28/09/2024).
Another interviewee points out the following:
“I have […] reported corruption anonymously to entities such as… the Attorney General’s Office […]. In my last job… at a university […], I discreetly reported irregular acts in the dean’s office, and the response was that my contract was not renewed […]” (A4, suffer from corruption, personal communication, 25/02/2025).
The way corruption is discussed reflects and reproduces its legitimacy or rejection. Phrases such as “it’s not stealing, it’s collecting what is owed to me” or “the fool is the one who doesn’t take advantage” are part of a symbolic repertoire that softens the meaning of the corrupt act [36, 37]. In the words of an interviewee:
“Corruption is related to cultural factors, such as the lack of ethical education from home and school […]. The structure of the political-administrative system also plays a role, where it is common for actions within legislative bodies to be conditioned on exchanges, sometimes in the form of contracts that include gifts, which ultimately result in corruption” (A4, policymaker, personal communication, 22/01/2025).
Another interviewee indicates that:
“In Colombia, there is a culture of ‘the clever one thrives at the expense of the fool’ […], where cheating is celebrated and the easiest path is sought. I consider this mentality to be a cultural problem related not only to the war experienced in the country but also to drug trafficking” (A7, policymakers, personal communication, 03/11/2024).
In summary, this line addresses the processes of corruption that are established, reproduced, and justified in the daily life of social relations. It encompasses everything from internalized moral values to practices shared by collectives, including cultural imaginaries that reinterpret corruption as a means of advancement, a survival mechanism, or a normalized practice. It highlights the symbolic and ethical dimensions of the phenomenon, emphasizing that, to understand corruption in depth, it is necessary to move beyond a legalistic perspective and explore the cultural and social frameworks in which it acquires legitimacy or moral neutralization. This construct explains why, despite formal controls, clientelistic networks, bribery, favoritism, and the misuse of public resources continue to be socially tolerated or even celebrated.
4.1.3 Processes of oversight and safeguarding of the public good
This line refers to the set of normative, institutional, and social instruments through which the state and civil society regulate, supervise, and distribute public resources, both in their origin, management, and allocation, as well as in their use and outcomes. This construct serves as a backbone for understanding the tensions between democratic transparency and institutional capture in contexts marked by structural corruption and social inequality [38–40]. In the words of one interviewee:
“Citizen oversight should be expanded through watchdogs, control representatives, and mechanisms of deconcentration rather than decentralization. Control should involve citizens, even symbolically, such as youth comptroller offices linked to educational institutions […]. Secondly, information systems must be strengthened: just as cameras issue traffic fines in real time, there should be systems that monitor contracting, acquisitions, social programs, and the implementation of public administration in real time, with observatories […]. Without this, control would only be symbolic” (A2, suffer from corruption, personal communication, 24/02/2025).
Another interviewee, who fights against corruption, indicated that:
“The 1991 Political Constitution eliminated oversight control in Colombia and replaced it with comprehensive auditing […], which subsequently evaluates government activities, unlike the oversight control that monitored actions at the very moment of their execution” (A6, fight against corruption, personal communication, 03/10/2024).
This change weakened the preventive capacity and established a reactive logic, as noted by one interviewee:
“Institutions must build a system of transparency and a public ethics focused on common goods and social justice […]. In Colombia, although the State is an important actor, it is often guided by particular interests […]. Moreover, entities such as the Comptroller’s Office, the Attorney General’s Office, and the Ombudsman’s Office fail to coordinate effectively to strengthen this ethics within society” (A2, fight against corruption, personal communication, 03/10/2024).
In relation to oversight, it can be noted that this encompasses the technical and legal procedures that ensure accountability, monitor public management, and identify irregularities in the use of resources. It includes mechanisms such as external and internal audits, fiscal control, social oversight, citizen watchdogs, courts of accounts, comptroller offices, and state supervisory bodies [2, 41]. In the words of one interviewee:
“Corruption is not exclusive to the public sector but also affects the private sector. Its main causes in both areas are related to the lack of prior traceability […], as well as the absence of direct oversight during resource execution […]. This results in oversight being delayed and, when carried out, functioning as an ‘archaeology’ of the process, often after the resources have already been lost” (A5, suffer from corruption, personal communication, 06/03/2025).
Another interviewee indicates that:
“The Colombian State is small […], with limited institutional capacities to prevent, control, and intervene in corruption. There is no strong transparency system, and although the public function performs its work […], much more is required than what currently exists as a society” (A2, fight against corruption, personal communication, 03/10/2024).
Participation refers to the spaces and processes in which citizens intervene directly or indirectly in decisions regarding public resources. It involves not only consultation or social oversight but also deliberation, codecision, and comanagement of budgets, as in participatory budgeting models, coordination tables, and local planning instances [42, 43]. In the words of one interviewee:
“After the 1991 Constitution, the Colombian State is ‘paradoxical’ […], since although it is defined as a Social State under the rule of law, it delegates the provision of public goods and services to private actors, creating markets and increasing intermediation. This is partly due to the fact that the economy is small, which generates pressure from private actors to participate […]. As the chain of intermediaries expands, the resources available to guarantee rights are limited, and if some also seek to gain more than they should […], those resources are further reduced” (A1, policymaker, personal communication, 11/11/2024).
Another interviewee indicates that:
“The Colombian State has been co-opted by clientelist and contracting logics that create in citizens the feeling that nothing is going to change. […] Corruption, which takes away nearly 50 trillion pesos every year, is expressed in contracts with cost overruns, breaches, inadequate materials, or deficient services, all under the pretext of saving resources that, in reality, finance bribes” (A5, policymakers, personal communication, 06/09/2024).
The distribution of resources refers to the way in which the state’s economic resources are allocated, redistributed, or concentrated, whether through public policies, contracts, fiscal transfers, territorial investments, or social programs. This construct highlights both the criteria of equity and distributive justice, as well as the patterns of institutionalized inequality that foster clientelistic practices, nepotism, or corruption [25, 44]. In the words of one interviewee:
“Corruption fosters informality across all economic sectors, making it difficult for formal businesses to operate. Moreover, diverted resources are no longer invested, and taxes for companies could be lower if corruption were reduced” (A1, entrepreneurs, personal communication, 11/10/2024).
Another interviewee points out that:
“The factor that has driven corruption in Colombia […] is political […]. That corruption extends into the business sphere […] regarding the tax burden. […] Another factor that has a major impact is the poor distribution of wealth […], which translates into corruption” (A1, business professionals, personal communication, 13/02/2025).
This line is associated with concepts such as horizontal and vertical accountability, transparent and equitable public spending, and integrated public management systems. Furthermore, it is linked to the challenges of building a Social Rule of Law, where participation and oversight are not merely technical mechanisms but forms of political and ethical action that dispute the meaning of the public sphere in the face of corruption [5, 45]. In the words of one interviewee:
“When I began my work as an entrepreneur, I had contacts with public hospitals […]. The director of a hospital in Florida, Valle, asked me to overcharge by 70% in order to distribute money […]. I simply nodded during the meeting, but I never went back nor sent the invoice […]. Later, I found out that another colleague did make that deal with public hospitals in Valle del Cauca” (A4, suffer from corruption, personal communication, 25/02/2025).
“Corrupt politicians reflect the logic of drug trafficking… it was even said that politics was more profitable than narco, as happened in Valle del Cauca. […] That easy-money culture permeates everything: from small towns to the national government, and even private life with the ‘CVY’ (what’s in it for me). In my experience, across Latin America only in Colombia have clients asked for extra percentages to close deals. […] This connects to inequality: the economy is concentrated in Bogotá (65% of the country) while the rest is marginalized. […] There is also a lack of qualifications in politics: anyone can govern, while in education and the private sector formal training is required. […] Popular culture reinforces this: people say that to become rich there are two ways, either marry or get votes. […] In short, we have normalized corruption and accept it at all levels by keeping silent” (A3, entrepreneurs, personal communication, 14/11/2024).
In sum, the mechanisms of control, participation, and distribution of public resources are decisive in the degree of corruption or integrity within a political–administrative system. Their design, implementation, and social appropriation reflect the quality of governance, the depth of democracy, and a society’s ethical commitment to the common good.
The findings confirm that the analysis is validated in the Colombian case through three interpretative lines that articulate institutional deterioration, governance capture, sociocultural dynamics, and the participation and distribution of public resources as a structural, cultural, and systemic phenomenon.
5.1 Institutional configuration and governance of corruption
The mechanisms of control and participation appear more as symbolic than functional devices, coopted by political and economic elites who operate through informal codes (the trick becomes law). Corruption is not situated outside institutional structures but rather articulated from within them, legitimizing clientelist and patronage networks that transform the distribution of public resources into instruments of political control. This pattern reproduces social exclusion, impunity, and state capture, despite reforms such as the 1991 Constitution, thereby displacing citizens from a leading role to a clientelist position. However, this same dimension emerges as a potential space for transformation if reconfigured through ethical and democratic practices.
5.2 Cultural and ethical mutations in society
Corruption appears as a normalized cultural trait: internalized from childhood, reinforced by the figure of the “smart one” versus the “fool,” and justified by a situational ethic that rewards complicity and punishes integrity. Everyday language resignifies the illicit as cleverness and necessity, while the phenomenon takes on territorial variations depending on region and social structure. The commodification of relationships and the advance of the neoliberal model have weakened community values, imposing an instrumental ethic that subordinates the public interest to the private. Corruption is even legitimized as a vehicle for accessing state resources in marginalized territories. Nonetheless, critical voices emerge which, although marginalized, constitute nuclei of ethical resistance.
5.3 Processes of oversight and safeguarding of the public good
Oversight systems have shifted toward ex post audits, weakening accountability and consolidating sophisticated corruption schemes. Institutions such as comptrollers’ offices or inspectorates appear coopted or ineffective, while public–private intermediation amplifies opportunities for cost overruns and clientelism. The distribution of resources, far from responding to equity, becomes a mechanism for reproducing inequality and exclusion. Citizen participation, although recognized in theory, is, in practice, marginal, manipulated, or devoid of binding power. Finally, the business sector denounces corruption as a structural condition for accessing contracts, revealing the fusion between political business and public management. Accountability, stripped of sanctioning effectiveness, is reduced to mere formality, perpetuating impunity and institutional distrust.
Taken together, these variables show that corruption in Colombia is not an accident or an excess, but rather a mode of organizing political, economic, and social power, sustained by weak institutions, permissive cultures, and ineffective control mechanisms. However, the very same spaces identified may also become points of rupture if redefined toward more ethical, inclusive, and democratic practices.
Corruption in Colombia emerges as a structural phenomenon reproduced at the intersection of three interpretive lines: a weak institutional framework coopted by elites that turn governance into a mechanism of domination; a social and ethical culture marked by the normalization of illegal practices and the double standards that legitimize corruption as a strategy for survival or social mobility; and mechanisms of control, participation, and resource distribution that, far from ensuring justice and equity, reinforce clientelistic logics and social exclusion. In this context, corruption is not an anomaly of the system but rather a functional and everyday mode of articulation between the state, the market, and society, which undermines public ethics, fragments citizen trust, and perpetuates historical inequalities. Nevertheless, the findings also suggest that the re-signification of ethical values, the genuine democratization of participation, and the strengthening of transparent and autonomous institutions could open cracks to transform this model of corrupt governance into one based on equity, integrity, and social justice.
I wish to honor the memory of my parents, María Esther Botero Ocampo and Daniel Yanguas Hoyos, to whom I owe everything I am and to whom I am infinitely grateful for all the love and care they provided me throughout their lives.
I extend my deepest gratitude to my wife, Paola Cristina Astudillo Martínez, and to my children, Véronica Yanguas Astudillo and Ibis Miguel Yanguas Astudillo, for their love, tenderness, care, and understanding throughout this stage of my doctoral studies.
I am also grateful to the Faculty of Administrative Sciences and the Vice-Rectory of Research at the University of Valle for the unconditional support received during the final stage of my Doctorate in Government, Public Policy, and Public Administration.
I would also like to thank my thesis advisors, Doctors Alexander Zúñiga Collazos and Omar de Jesús Montilla Galvis, for their understanding, dedication, and support throughout this process. Without you, obtaining the doctoral degree would not have been possible. My infinite gratitude.
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Written By
Ibis Danilo Yanguas-Botero
Submitted: 21 August 2025Reviewed: 03 September 2025Published: 02 March 2026
Open access peer-reviewed chapter - ONLINE FIRST
